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1. inTroducTion
The concept of MLG may be defined as a political process of determining the Com-
munity’s goals and taking action to achieve them (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 
2004). It is strongly tied with the process of European integration and the systems of 
controlling and managing the European Union policies. The ideas and principles of 
MLG have emerged in response to changes in political power structures in Western 
Europe when the countries decided to co-exist in a single alliance in order to main-
tain the vision of a uniform idea. For that reason a system needs to be established 
that will allow such an efficient control and coordination of member countries’ ac-
tivities that will lead to the joint objectives which have been set. The concept of 
MLG is particularly associated with the processes of regionalisation and the Euro-
pean integration, and the implementation of the EU’s policies and its decision-mak-
ing process. The European integration has resulted in extending and deepening the 
policies of the EU, with impacts on the autonomy and the authority of the member 
states. Prior to the establishment of the EU, each country administered itself cen-
trally and with a full autonomy of its order, and its relations to other countries were 
regulated in international bilateral or multilateral agreements. The establishment of 
the EU, however, has formed another, international level of control, which has been 
significantly interacting with how each country is controlled, affecting each coun-
try’s legal order and enforcing its methods of control. Consequently, there has been 
a shift from national control over national matters to making decisions within the 
EU (Rosamond, 2000). Puchala (1971) defined four basic arenas where political de-
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cisions take place, with these decisions then being implemented through the bureau-
cratic machinery. These arenas are: supranational, national, regional, and local. The 
national system only regards the local, regional and national arenas as the standard 
arenas whereas the process of the European integration has brought about a new 
level of administration, the supranational level. This supranational administration is 
executed through institutions applying multi-level governance. The decision-mak-
ing role of these institutions is crucial and powers are distributed along the whole 
range of the political spectrum. as a result, the success of the European integration 
fully depends on how successful and capable administration will be in implement-
ing political decisions. Hooghe and Marks (2001, pp. 69–77) claim that power del-
egated to a lower level and the European integration have resulted in a drop of the 
state level authority in Western Europe, followed by the formation of multi-level ad-
ministration. From the theoretical point of view the European integration associated 
with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism – movements which seek a shift 
of power from the state to institutions. according to George (2004, pp. 108–112), 
MLG covers all the most important elements of neofunctionalism except for the 
spill-over process.1 Marks says, however, that these theories are unfit for analysing 
everyday processes.
2. mulTi-leVel goVernance
The term was coined by Gary Marks, who worked on the EC structural poli-
cy reforms in 1988, which proposed doubling the contributions to the relatively 
poor European countries. These reforms followed upon the agreement adopted by 
member states in 1987 (the Single European act). Marks (1993, p. 392) defined 
mLG as a 
[…] system of permanent negotiations between governments at several levels – supranational, 
national, regional and local, and a result of a wide process of forming institutions and re-distributing 
the decision-making process, which has pulled some formerly centralised functions of the state up to 
the supranational level and pushed some other functions down to the regional or local level.
as early as his previous works Marks dealt with this topic (his structural policy 
work from 1992, for instance). The term itself, however, was not used until the 
publication from 1993. In this work Marks (1993) says that regional policy under-
went many changes in the 1980s and the 1990s and regional policy is influenced 
by not only the governments of the member countries and regional governments 
but also supranational stakeholders (Marks, 1993, pp. 401–403). 
1 Spill-over effect – integration expands of its own accord; competence and sovereignty shift from 
the national to the supranational level: political spill-over (Moravcsik, 2005, p. 352).
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Transnational stakeholders along with the Commission have formed a vertical line by circum-
venting member countries and challenging their traditional roles of the sole intermediary between 
the transnational and the supranational levels. Direct contacts between the Commission and the 
transnational government representatives are an everyday reality in both Brussels and regions 
(Marks, 1993, p. 402).
Figure 1 describes the situation of member countries acting as the intermedi-
ary between home stakeholders and supranational institutions whereas figure 2 
describes a more complex, open and volatile situation of national governments 
collaborating with the European Commission and within the state. Figure 2 is 
misleading because it presupposes a homogeneous system of MLG across the 
EU. In fact, different member countries have different options (Marks, 1993, 
pp. 404–405). 
Marks also dealt with MLG with Hooghe (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Their 
MLG typology distinguishes two types of multi-level governance. Type I based 
on federalism and type II based on neoclassical political economy. according to 
Hooghe and Marks, type II is almost always set in the legal framework of type I. 
Fig. 2. Multi-level governance after 1992
Source: Marks (1993), p. 405
Fig. 1. Multi-level governance until 1992
Source: Marks (1993), p. 405
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Type II cannot exist without type I but type I can exist without type II (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2003, p. 236). according to Bache (2005, p. 6), these two types of 
MLG do not exclude each other; on the contrary, they co-exist. The United King-
dom is an example. 
Marks and Hooghe are not the only ones who have developed the idea of multi-
level governance. Jachtenfuchs, for instance, (in Stein and Turkewitsch, 2008, 
p. 9) says that ‘MLG includes relations of different public administration levels 
and the processes resulting from these relations’. other authors put this definition 
in more specific terms and supply additional features: 
Even though we tend to think that these levels are ordered in a hierarchy, negotiations may not 
necessarily be conducted by this hierarchy but may be conducted between the transnational and the 
regional levels, for instance, skipping the national level (Stein and Turkewitsch, 2008, p. 9). 
Peters and Pierre (2001, p. 131) claim that ‘the formation of MLG challenges 
our traditional understanding of how states work, what defines their powers, how 
democracy is structured and a responsible government established’. according to 
Peters and Pierre, the state has changed from ‘the liberal-democratic type to a state 
characterised by various complex types of subordination to external entities and 
dependence on these entities’. 
Bache and Flinders (in Stein and Turkewitsch, 2008, p. 10) admit that no single 
generally accepted definition of MLG has been adopted as yet. However, there 
are some identifiable common features (Bache and Flinders, 2004 in Stein and 
Turkewitsch, 2008, p. 10): 
1. Tendency towards greater involvement of non-government organisations, 
such as non-profit organisations, in governmental functions;
2. Extension of overlapping decision-making networks involved in such 
functions;
3. Role of the state having changed from ruling and controlling to managing, 
coordinating and forming networks;
4. Defined responsibility for executing the managing function in multi-level 
governance.
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006, pp. 332–333) gives five features to define the sys-
tem of MLG in the EU: multiple partakers, differentiation, technocracy, non-hier-
archical process of decision-making, informal relations. 
as any other concept, the concept of MLG has been critically examined. an-
drew Jordan (2001) is one of the critical voices. according to Jordan (2001), MLG 
is just a mixture of existing theoretical claims and nothing new. In terms of par-
takers Jordan’s criticism is based on that MLG assigns too an important role to 
national and supranational entities and overlooks the role of the state as the creator 
of policies. also, MLG presupposes a passive shift of power from the EU or the 
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national levels whereas the bottom-up view should be preferred. Stein and Turke-
witsch (2008, pp. 9–10) are additional critics, giving several reasons why the idea 
is subject to such criticism (excessive descriptiveness of the model, for instance). 
They maintain that the concept of MLG can be used to describe any complex and 
multilateral political process.
3. euroPean union and mulTi-leVel goVernance
MLG is thus seen as the sharing of each partakers decision-making competencies 
at different levels of governance. The EU has entered the game and the boundaries 
between levels have become less distinct. The EU sets rules through the European 
Commission, makes decisions and, consequently, its acts influence the behaviour 
of member states as far as the local level. 
as the integration process is continuous, different approaches to MLG have 
developed over time. The most in-depth are the approaches to MLG in imple-
menting the cohesion policy, which is the second most important policy of the 
EU (after the agricultural policy). Cohesion policy’s interventions have profound 
impacts on member states’ decision-making processes at the national, regional 
and local levels. The basic multi-governance standards were set out as early as the 
Treaty on EU (92/C 191/01; the Maastricht Treaty), and not only in this area. The 
following passages of this paper will only deal with the cohesion policy in relation 
to its marked impacts on how regions work and develop. 
articles 174 to 178 of the Treaty on the EU lay down the basic principles of 
supporting and controlling the cohesion policy. Funds have been set up for these 
purposes that provide member states with the required finance for implementing 
interventions. Currently, the processes are further regulated in regulative acts, es-
pecially Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 laying down general provisions 
on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006 setting out the rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the Eu-
ropean Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion 
Fund and of Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the European Regional Development Fund, which set how nation-
al authorities are to act towards the EC and introduce programming and project 
management principles. Emphasis is put on the broadest possible involvement of 
partakers in the process of cohesion policy implementation at the local and the re-
gional levels without affecting the responsibility and the powers of member states 
as a whole. The Committee of the Regions exists at the EU level, and its role is 
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to express the opinions of local and regional self-governing units about the EU’s 
legal rules. To this end, the Committee submits reports (termed as ‘opinions’ in 
respect of Commission proposals (European Union, 2012). The Committee is an 
important political partakers providing the necessary feedback for the institutions 
which make decisions at the supranational level, that is the European Commis-
sion. The Committee of the Regions has published the White Paper on public af-
fairs MLG (Committee of the Regions, 2009) in order to establish and codify the 
understanding and the meaning of public affairs MLG into a comprehensible text. 
It is a technical document, which regards MLG as partnership-based coordinated 
efforts of the Union, its member states, and local and regional authorities focus-
ing on developing EU’s policies and putting them into practice (Committee of the 
Regions, 80th Session).
The White Paper reads that in spite of the importance of MLG in relation 
to achieving the EU’s objectives and interests, MLG fails to be applied in all 
policies; if it is applied in all policies, it is not applied symmetrically and homo-
geneously (Committee of the Regions, 2009, p. 4). as a result, the Committee 
formulated MLG recommendations on the basis of the valid agreements and in 
accordance with the Lisbon Treaty and incorporated the territorial aspect and ter-
ritorial cohesion in the processes of European integration (Committee of the Re-
gions, 2009, p. 4).
according to the Committee, partnership is the basic MLG principle, and the 
legitimacy, effectiveness and visibility of how the EU works can only be ensured 
by each partaker having their share in the decision-making process, even at the 
regional and local levels.
The European Commission defined five principles of public affairs governance 
as early as 2001 (EC White Paper, CoM(2001) 428). Governance should be based 
on openness, involvement, responsibility, effectiveness, and cohesion. MLG fol-
lows upon these principles in that executing MLG consists in observing another 
important principle – the principle of subsidiarity. This principle and its obser-
vance ensure that decision-making does not concentrate at a single level of public 
authority execution and policies are formed and implemented at all material levels 
of administration. This principle has been described as critical to and inseparable 
from the overall system of MLG (Committee of the Regions, 2009, p. 7).
This also implies that the execution of MLG rests, to a considerable extent, 
with member states, which, however, have absorbed these principles to different 
degrees. There is a great difference between the 15 ‘original’ members states and 
the 10 ‘new’ member states, which accessed in 2004, and the two states which ac-
cessed in 2007. In fact, the process of implementing MLG actually did not start 
until the accession to the EU. Democracy in the original member states is much 
more developed and decision-making at local and regional levels is an everyday 
reality. 
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The basic tool for the execution of MLG are institutions and institutional rep-
resentation of regional and local bodies. This had been first regulated in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, which contained major reforms to the institutional system, and then 
detailed and confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. Institutions are the basis for execut-
ing multi-level governance, which, along with its processes, will only be brought 
into existence by collaboration along the whole horizontal and vertical institu-
tional system of all partners. This is an important phenomenon which collabora-
tion must always rely on and which, although impossible to be constituted or en-
forced, is yet a precondition for due execution of governance. It is the trust among 
partners. Consequently, trust rather than confrontation of different political and 
democratic legitimacies is the fundamental feature of collaboration (Committee 
of the Regions, 2009, p. 11).
The Committee of the Regions, as an important institute, is in charge of regions 
and cities participating in the execution of governance and the adoption of politi-
cal decisions at supranational level. The White Paper is an important element in 
clarifying what MLG is and by what principles and methods it is executed. as 
a result, the White Paper provides a bridge between MLG theories and the reality, 
which is not always fully taken account of at European institutions and national 
authorities.
The cohesion policy is a policy which fully demonstrates all the positive and 
negative consequences of multi-level governance. In the cohesion policy, the Eu-
ropean Community’s objectives are implemented through financial interventions. 
and it is financial interventions and the need to distribute, manage and control 
these interventions effectively that causes many complications at all levels of 
multi-level governance. 
4. mulTi-leVel goVernance on The examPle of eu counTries – 
comParison of The czech rePublic, Poland and hungary
MLG is not applied in all policies and states of the EU symmetrically and ho-
mogeneously. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary can illustrate this, as 
the countries of the visegrad Group, which is now comprised of four countries. 
Before describing MLG and the cohesion policy in the said countries, the su-
pranational level (the EU institutions) needs to be presented. at this level it is 
especially the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, the European Com-
mission, the European Court of auditors, and the European anti-fraud office. 
The European Parliament is the only body of the Community whose sessions 
are open to the public. Its decisions, positions and minutes from sessions are 
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published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. as all bodies 
of representatives the European Parliament has three basic powers: legislative, 
budgetary and controlling. Its political role in the EU has been increasing. The 
European Parliament plays the key role in appointing the Commission, and has 
the power to dismiss the Commission (for more information refer to the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the amsterdam Treaty, and the Nice Treaty). along with the Eu-
ropean Commission Council, the European Parliament adopts acts which have 
direct impact on people’s lives and a large international impact. The Council and 
the European Parliament are the Union’s law-makers. Usually, the Council may 
only create legislative acts on the basis of bills submitted by the European Com-
mission. The main tasks of the Council include (Council of the European Union, 
2012) adopting legislative acts (regulations, directives etc.), usually by ‘joint 
decision-making’ with the European Parliament, contributing to coordination of 
member states’ policies, such as economic policies, creating common foreign 
and security policies according to the strategic directions defined by the Euro-
pean Council, entering into international agreements on behalf of the Union, and 
approving the Union’s budget in conjunction with the European Parliament. Still 
another body is the European Commission, the EU’s executive body represent-
ing the interests of the whole Union. The European Commission is to (European 
Union, 2012) define goals and priorities, propose legal rules to the European 
Parliament and the Council, control and enforce the EU’s policies and comply 
with the EU’s budget, enforce European law (in conjunction with the European 
Court of Justice), and represent the EU in external matters, such as in negotiat-
ing trade treaties between the EU and third countries. The entire system needs 
a controlling institution. It is primarily the European Court of auditors and the 
European anti-fraud office (oLaF). The European Court of auditors audits the 
EU’s accounts. Its primary task is to enhance the standard of financial control in 
the EU and produce reports on how public money is spent. If a fraud or an irreg-
ularity is identified, the European Court of auditors, however, has no power to 
take any legal action but communicates its findings to the European anti-fraud 
office (European Union, 2012). although being part of the European Commis-
sion, the oLaF is independent in its investigations. The oLaF has a dedicated 
budget and enjoys autonomy in administrative matters. This office’s mission 
is three-fold (European Union, 2012): protect financial interests of the EU by 
fighting frauds, corruption and other illegal activities, and protect the reputation 
of the European bodies and institutions by investigating suspicion of serious 
misconduct by employees of the European bodies or institutions. Disciplinary 
or criminal proceedings may be instituted on the basis of such investigation. The 
third mission is to help the European Commission in preparing and implement-
ing the policies focused on detecting and fighting frauds. 
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4.1. czech republic
Currently, there is no effective law in the Czech Republic that would complexly 
and comprehensively govern management of the structural funds and the respec-
tive legal regulation has been fractionalized. one of the most important laws re-
lated to the regional policy is act No. 248/2000 Coll., on Support of Regional 
Development that establishes institutionalized conditions for implementation and 
coordination of the Economic and Social Cohesion Policy. The legal regulations 
of the Czech Republic further governs important areas, such as public procure-
ment, financial control, archival science, accounting, regional development sup-
port, hereinafter act No. 128/2000 Coll., on Municipalities, and act No. 129/2000 
Coll., on Regions etc. Individual functions in the implementation system, as they 
are stipulated in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, are entrusted to respec-
tive state administration authorities or regional self-administration authorities by 
means of a government resolution. The Czech Republic selected the form of pre-
funding from the state budget where all expense is first paid from the state budget 
and subsequently an EU share is refunded from the respective fund by means of 
so-called certification. This fact means that financial and administrative steps are 
controlled in accordance with effective rules for controlling the state budget. In 
practice, it means increased number of subjects that perform control and relatively 
high burden for administrative capacities to undergo such control.
From the institutional aspect, four institutions exist in this control and coordi-
nation area of the National Strategic Reference Framework2 (NSRF), and they are: 
NSRF Monitoring Committee – Steering and Coordination Committee, National 
Coordination authority, Payment Certification authority – the National Fund, the 
audit authority – the Central Harmonization Unit for Financial Control. In order 
to strengthen coordination, four coordination committees were established based 
on four NSRF strategic goals. The National Coordination authority is a coordi-
nation and methodology authority accountable for the NSRF implementation to 
the CR government. This authority has established a uniform framework of im-
plementation environment for management, realisation, control, monitoring, and 
evaluation of operational programmes (the Ministry for Regional Development, 
2012). By means of a government resolution, the function of the Payment and 
Certification authority, as well as the audit authority, is entrusted to the Ministry 
of Finance of the Czech Republic, and the function of the National Coordination 
authority to the Ministry for Regional Development. operational programmes 
are managed either by central state administration authorities or so-called regional 
councils that are governed by act No. 248/2000 Coll., on Support of regional de-
2 The basic programming document of the Czech Republic for utilsation of the EU funds during 
2007–2013 whose processing is derived from obligations of a member country defined in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006. 
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velopment. a lot of persons are involved in implementation of every operational 
programme, especially when performing the function of the managing authority, 
intermediate body, monitoring committee, payment and certification authority, 
and audit authority.3 The Czech Republic also has established the separate office 
for the Protection of Competition that makes decisions regarding suspicions in the 
area of public procurement (see the Public Procurement act). Its power and scope 
is defined by act No. 273/1996 Coll., on scope of competence of the office for 
the Protection of Competition. other monitoring function, especially in regard of 
monitoring spending of funds from the state budget, is performed by financial au-
thorities. Independent monitoring is provided by the Constitution via the Supreme 
Control office.
as for the territorial self-governing structure, the Czech Republic consists of 
14 regions that were established by Constitutional act No. 347/1997Coll., on es-
tablishment of higher territorial self-governing units. This act fulfilled article 99 
of the Constitution of the Czech Republic which stipulates that the Czech Repub-
lic ‘is structured into municipalities, which form the basic self-governing units, 
and regions, which form higher territorial self-governing units’. Regions are ac-
countable to NUTS III units. For the purpose of the regional policy of the EU and 
classification of regions under individual objectives, these regions were grouped 
into eight so-called cohesion regions that are accountable to the NUTS II units. 
These units associate either one or two, and in one case three, regions in one unit. 
The cohesion regions do not have legal subjectivity and the offices of Regional 
Council whose apparatus administers and governs financial flows to the respec-
tive region were established for management of regional operational programmes. 
However, this solution proved to be not suitable in practice. The implementation 
system became more difficult as a result of different needs of regions associated in 
one unit in this way and responsibility of the respective office for damages caused 
by defective acts is disputable as well. Towns and municipalities are involved, just 
like other interested parties, in decision-making via monitoring committees where 
individual involved parties may enforce their respective interests.
The Czech Republic was allocated 26.7 billion EUR for the cohesion policy 
during the 2007–2013 programming period, which is almost three times as much 
as during the previous shortened programming period of 2004–2006. For this pe-
riod, the Czech Republic has 26 operational programmes, of which 18 are actively 
controlled via Czech managing authorities. There are 7 regional operational pro-
grammes being realized in the Czech Republic, 2 operational programmes for 
Prague (oP Prague – adaptability, oP Prague – Competitiveness), one cross-bor-
der cooperation operational programme (oP Cross-Border Cooperation CR – Po-
land), and the remainder falls on thematic operational programmes, and there are 
8 of them.
3 Performance of individual functions is governed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006.
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only during implementation the complications that resulted from this initial 
setup fully emerged. Large amount of operational programmes almost prevented 
monitoring and control of fulfilment of NSRF objectives, and it caused multiplica-
tion of administrative and other mistakes of individual offices, which became fully 
evident in 2012 by suspension of payments from the EU and the necessity to reset 
the implementation system. The control system is strongly decentralized and from 
the aspect of achieving the objectives specified on the national level, it is very dif-
ficult to control activities that lead to as effective valuation of funds as possible. 
The initial idea about advantages of such decentralized system came to nought 
already during the first years of implementation. The system suffers from a lot 
of defects and externally appears as non-transparent and difficult to use. Trust in 
such system significantly decreased after series of corruption suspicions and in-
vestigations of bodies active in criminal proceedings. Generally, it is possible to 
state that operational programmes have fulfilled their objectives, but it is difficult 
to analyze if they contribute to national objectives. Complexity of the system turns 
a significant part of attention to its administration, and not enough of it is paid to 
real contributions and effects of individual interventions.
4.2. hungary
Hungary joined the EU on May 1, 2004, the same as the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
Institutional frameworks as well as responsibilities of certain stakeholders are laid down by 
Government decree 255/2006 (XII 8) on the fundamental rules and institutions in charge of imple-
mentation of support from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund in the 2007–2013 programming period General procedures are regulated by 
MHPMo (Minister Heading the Prime Minister’s office) – MF (Minister of Finance) Joint Decree 
16/2006 (XII 28) on general rules of implementation of support from the European Regional De-
velopment Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund in the 2007–2013 programming 
period. Rules concerning financial management and control systems are set by Government Decree 
281/2006 (XII 23) on rules concerning establishing systems of financial management and controls in 
relation to receiving support from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund in the 2007–2013 programming period responsible for the implementa-
tion of the EaFRD and EFF (National Development agency, 2007, p. 178).
The institutional system consists of institutions, such as the National Devel-
opment Council, the Steering Committee for Development Policy, the National 
Development agency etc. In the Hungarian system, the National Development 
Council is the advisory body of the government. In addition, the Steering Com-
mittee of Development Policy was established as a governmental body managed 
by the Prime Minister with participation of the Government Commissioner for the 
Development Policy. The National Development agency (NRa) is another insti-
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tution of the Hungarian implementation system. Based on the Hungarian model, 
the agency performs very similar functions as the current National Coordination 
authority; however, the significant difference lies in the fact that contrary to the 
Czech model, the agency has managing authorities of operational programmes 
that ensure implementation directly under, as independent departments. The big 
advantage of such solution rests in very efficient provision of uniform methodol-
ogy environment and monitoring system. Under the Hungarian model, the NRa 
operates in accordance with the legal regulations of Hungary. Managing authori-
ties are conceived as NRa independent bodies. Independence rests especially in 
decision-making regarding provisions of grants and the overall management of 
operational programmes in accordance with the effective European legislation. 
These managing authorities use uniform methodological procedures and one mon-
itoring system. Their activities are similar to the Czech managing authorities by 
supporting documents for their decisions are produced for them by the intermedi-
ate body. Managing authorities, in cooperation with ministries that are responsible 
for fulfilment of individual strategies and policies, then provide the partnership 
principle and the overall coordination of activities, which are then defined by 
so-called action plans, via committees for oP planning and implementation, sub-
committees and monitoring committees, and other institutes. Intermediate bodies 
have been selected by the NRa based on preset criteria, and their responsibilities 
are anchored in the Hungarian legal regulations. Performance of their work then 
rests in the overall administrative provision of implementation (preparation of 
calls, selection of projects, monitoring, execution of the 1st level controls, report-
ing of differences). Relationships between the intermediate bodies and manag-
ing authorities are established similarly as in the Czech environment, by means 
of delegated acts. Ministries will be mentioned as the last. In this implementa-
tion model, they are excluded from the direct administration within the imple-
mentation system. Their role rests in participation in planning, production of the 
action plan, project selection committees, monitoring committees, and also the 
aforementioned advisory bodies. all the managing authorities are concentrated in 
one institution, which ensures uniform management, methodical procedures, and 
transfers of the best practice. at the same time, managing authorities are respon-
sible especially for the strategic management of the programme, and intermediate 
subjects have higher competences, as well as responsibilities for administrative 
management. Decisions, such as on provision of a grant or approval of payment 
request, are left to the management authority, as well as decisions on preparation 
and realization of the action plan. 
as for the territorial structure, Hungary is structured into 19 districts, and 
the Capital City of Budapest, which are NUTS III units (Megyék és a főváros). 
There are 7 NUTS II (Régiók) regions, NUTS I is formed by 3 parts of the state, 
so-called országrész (Eurostat, 2012). The municipal self-governments are now 
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independent of the central unit, and there is no hierarchy among them. Their rights 
and obligations are stipulated by the law – Self Government act. 
For the 2007–2013 programming period, there were 25.3 billion EUR allo-
cated in Hungary, and these funds are divided among 21 operational programmes 
(8 nationwide oPs, 7 regional oPs, 6 oPs within the European Territorial Coop-
eration objective). 
4.3. republic of Poland
Multilevel administration is one of the principles of government that was incorpo-
rated into the regional policy reform in Poland, which is presented in the National 
Strategy of the Regional Development for 2010–2020. The important document 
regarding the area of the policy for the social, economic, and business cohesion 
in Poland is the act on principles of development policy of 2006 (Ustawa, 2006). 
Its objective rests in defining mechanisms for implementation and coordination 
of the structural policy, specifying rules for implementation of such policy, pre-
paring documents for its implementation etc. (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2008, 
p. 24). among important legal regulations, there are also (Ferry, 2004, p. 11; 
MRR, 2008, p. 8): act on the regional self-government of June 5, 1998, act on 
income of territorial units of November 26, 1998, act on principles of regional 
development support of May 12, 2000, act on public finance of June 30, 2005, 
and Decree of the Ministry for Regional Development of September 7, 2007 on 
costs related to implementation of operational programmes.
Coordination related to implementation of objectives 1 and 3 of the Cohesion 
Policy, NSRF, and implementation of all programmes realized in Poland and on its 
borders is under responsibility of the respective minister for regional development 
matters (the Minister for Regional Development). To ensure effective coordina-
tion of the NSRF implementation, the Prime Minister nominated a team lead by 
the respective minister for the regional development matters. as for the Coordina-
tion Committee (CC), its functions are as follows: horizontal coordination of poli-
cies, strategic monitoring, and evaluation of the NSRF implementation. The Com-
mittee is lead by the respective Minister for Regional Development. In addition, 
there are representatives of ministers involved in implementation of individual 
operational programmes and institutions that manage regional operational pro-
grammes, the respective minister for public finance, and a minister responsible for 
implementation of the joint agricultural policy and the joint fisheries policy. Rep-
resentatives of Polish associations of territorial self-governing units and represen-
tatives of social and economic partners (organisations associated in the tripartite 
commission for social and economic matters, non-governmental organisations, 
and representatives of the academic and scientific sphere) also participate in CC 
activities. Representatives of the European Commission and representatives of the 
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European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund may participate in 
CC meetings – with an advisory function. The Ministry for Regional Develop-
ment (represented by the Minister for Regional Development) functions as the 
Managing authority of Centrally Managed Programmes, whereas authorities of 
the respective voivodship are the Managing authority of the regional operational 
programmes. The Managing authority may delegate some of its competences to 
intermediate bodies; however, it is fully responsible for the programme implemen-
tation. Scope of responsibilities is defined by a contract or agreement. In addition 
to them, there are also intermediate bodies of the 2nd level – so-called second 
level intermediate bodies, to which an intermediate body may transfer a part of its 
responsibilities. Therefore, these are the institutions that are responsible for imple-
mentation of particular measures (operating groups) – e.g. for selection of projects 
(in accordance with selection criteria approved by the Monitoring Committee). 
They are often called implementing authorities). The institutional system also in-
cludes the certification authority, which is included in the organisation structure 
of the Ministry for Regional Development. as the last, we can mention the audit 
authority, which is included under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Poland. The reform of the Polish regional policy related to the 2010–2020 period 
strengthens the multi-level administration process and, therefore, prevents the top-
down government model (Hermann-Pawłowska, 2010).
The reform of 1990 lead to development in the vertical structure and introduc-
tion of the lowest self-government level – gminas. The year 1999 brought estab-
lishment of 16 self-governing regions – poviatas. The legal foundation of the ter-
ritorial self-government units is anchored in articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland of april 2, 1997 (Konstytucja, 1997). Matters of territo-
rial units are further elaborated in Section vII – Samorząd terytorialny. The basic 
territorial self-governing units in Poland are gminas (municipalities). These units 
have all the self-government matters entrusted to them, unless they are entrusted 
to other units. There are also powiatas whose legal regulation was executed by act 
on powiats self-government of June 5, 1998 (Ustawa, 1998a) and voivodships that 
were established by act on self-government of counties of June 5, 1998 (Ustawa, 
1998b). The Constitution does not contain higher territorial self-government units.
The time-period before 1999 was characterized by strong centralisation and 
sectoral approach, while the time-period after 1999 is characterized by decentrali-
sation of power in the regional development area. In the shortened 2004–2006 
programming period, the role of regions in implementation of the structural funds 
was limited in comparison with the current 2007–2013 programming period. Re-
sponsibility rested especially with the central level, and there was Integrated Re-
gional Development Programme available for all 16 regions. In the case of Po-
land, it is possible to see a dual system where regional, as well as governmental 
levels were included. The aforementioned system brought increased costs and 
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decreased effectiveness of the whole system. Decentralisation resulted in situation 
where in the current programming period, every region is a managing authority 
responsible for setting development priorities and preparation and implementation 
of the regional operational programme. Selection of projects, monitoring, control, 
and evaluation are under responsibility of the office of the Marshal of the voivod-
ship. Regions as managing authorities may delegate some of its tasks to other enti-
ties. as for the voivodships, their tasks rest especially in certification of expenses 
on the respective territory (Hermann-Pawłowska, 2010).
During the 2007–2013 programming period, Poland was the biggest benefi-
ciary from the EU structural funds when it receives an allocation of approximately 
1/5 of the total amount of funds allocated for the Cohesion Policy. The follow-
ing operational programmes have been implemented in Poland: Infrastructure 
and Environment Programme, Innovative Economy Programme, Human Capi-
tal Programme, 16 regional programmes, Development of Eastern Poland Pro-
gramme, Technical assistance Programme, and European Territorial Cooperation 
Programmes.
5. conclusions
Description of the system and functioning of the multilevel administration in three 
sample countries confirms the premise stated in the opening of this text, as well as 
issues and aspect related to the White Book, i.e. that despite the importance and 
de facto necessity for the multilevel administration in relation to achieving objec-
tives and interests of the EU, such administration is applied in all the policies neither 
consistently nor effectively, and if it is, then neither symmetrically, nor uniformly.
In Poland, we can observe the duplicity principle in the public administration. 
From our aspect, the Polish system is characterized by complexity and, to a great 
extent, fragmentation. on the other hand, the non-duplicity system, so-called joint 
model, is applied in the Czech Republic. In the Czech regulations, contrary to Pol-
ish regulations, a separate institution that would centralize important strategic and 
conceptual documents and subsequently comment on their fulfilment (institution 
of the Development Policy Managing authority) is not established. Currently, it is 
not possible to reasonably expect that over brash establishment of such an author-
ity in the Czech legal environment would have significantly helped to faster and 
more efficiently set up the implementation system.
Complexity of establishment of such authority in the Czech Republic can 
be also assumed from the aspect of thematically concentrated operational pro-
grammes when it is possible to assume that the system, in which the managing au-
thority function would be executed by the state administration body (that, accord-
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ing to the competence act, does not cover all areas in which it should intervene) 
would bring significant complications during its execution as for financial flows 
and intervention into competences of other resorts. From this aspect, establish-
ment of an agency seems to be a more effective solution. Nevertheless, such agen-
cy does not have to be established by the law. The Constitution of the CR does not 
forbid to establish other administration bodies and assign them with competences 
if it is stipulated by law and such law was issued later than the Constitution itself. 
of course, it would have to be ensured that newly defined competences would not 
overlap with competences defined in the Competence act and other regulations 
that establish other bodies (e.g. state funds etc.). For such agency, a budget item 
would be established in the state budget, through which transfer of funds would 
be executed and expended in relation to the purpose for which this agency was 
established. From our viewpoint, the Polish system is characterized by complexity 
and, to a great extent, fragmentation.
The Hungarian model offers possible solution for realisation of thematically 
concentrated units and direct management, monitoring, and evaluation of inter-
ventions. at the same time, it does not necessarily mean that certain levels must 
be under the patronage of the office of the Government because competences 
and legal regulations can be different in the Czech environment, which would 
not allow for complete takeover of this model. at the same time, it is clear that 
without efficient, uniform, and direct management of implementation, it is not 
possible to achieve efficient fulfilment of objectives delineated by the EU Treaty 
with sufficient synergic effect. at the same time, it is necessary to ensure indi-
vidual methodological environment and adherence to it. This system offers certain 
alternatives. 
If we are dealing with individual levels of management, then it is clear from 
the aspect of the multilevel administration that at the multinational level, uniform 
conditions are set via the European legislation and policies of the EU, which are 
further applied by European institutions against the member countries. Neverthe-
less, already at this level, it is possible to observe different approaches applied by 
the European institutions against individual member countries, as well as differ-
ent approaches of various institutions when executing one policy. That means that 
nonuniformity during execution of the multinational administration level causes 
disharmony when executing administration at lower levels. at the national level, 
there are differences in implementation of the multinational regulation caused 
by different institutional systems and non-unified legal regulations. at the same 
time, territorial structures and different levels of autonomy of the self-governing 
units significantly complicate establishment of a single implementation system 
that would be similar in all member countries. 
The aforementioned description shows apparent differences in approaches to 
management of the cohesion policy in the monitored member countries where 
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models with more or less strengthened central management factors are examined. 
at the regional level, especially regional self-governments are involved in defi-
nition of strategies, as well as in management of some operational programmes 
whose objective rests especially in development of the respective region. Howev-
er, at this level, it is possible to see increased degree of corruption behaviour and 
low willingness to respect central authorities, which caused significant problems 
during implementation of, for example, the Czech model, and increased control 
activity at the multinational level. Czechia is trying to learn a lesson from this situ-
ation by establishment of centrally managed operational programme for the future 
period. However, these tendencies are not apparent in other monitored member 
countries where, to the contrary, necessity to maintain this regional level also for 
management of operational programmes is confirmed. Differences in the extent of 
independence and responsible behaviour of regional self-governments are then the 
cause of very different approaches of the member countries to implementation of 
this policy. at the local level, towns and municipalities are entering preparations 
of strategies via interested parties (e.g. association of Towns and Municipalities 
and similar ones in other member countries), and they play the key role of project 
beneficiaries during the implementation itself. Therefore, their role is slightly dif-
ferent because these entities are the key to the successful policy implementation. 
In order to fulfil their roles, it is necessary to encourage their willingness to pre-
pare strategies and achieve the maximum synergy effect of the partial projects by 
integrated approaches. 
From the aspect of the researched phenomenon, i.e. multilevel administration, 
further progress and development of the European integration is, therefore, the 
key for high-quality implementation of policies defined on the multinational level. 
Since the national units are significantly different from the aspect of the inner 
structure, it is not possible to achieve a uniform implementation model. Provi-
sion of the operative management role during implementation by institutions es-
tablished and managed by the EU up to the regional level could be considered. 
However, this idea seems to have a very low probability because it is not possible 
to assume that member countries would accept such intervention into their sover-
eignty and, therefore, in the light of the current integration trends, this solution is 
inconceivable. When considering the ideal implementation model, it is necessary 
to state that performance of functions defined by decrees would be rather entrusted 
to an entity out of the institutional system of a member country and, therefore, an 
agency that would be, in the ideal case, established by an independent legal act. 
Such agency would then manage individual operational programmes on the op-
erative base. Interested parties from all the levels of the multilevel administration 
should participate in defining strategies and evaluation of their fulfilment, as well 
as in defining recommendations for further proceeding, and their recommenda-
tions should be binding for the operative management.
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In conclusion, it is possible to state that the structure of the multilevel admin-
istration mostly depends on the legal regulations and order of the respective coun-
try. an act that would apply to the structural funds cannot cover all situations. In 
addition to legal regulations, dependence or independence of individual institu-
tions also rests in the territorial administration and management. one of the solu-
tions would be issuance of an act that would apply to all countries and would be 
binding for all of them; however, that does not have to be politically acceptable for 
all. Political changes are among the factors that affect the multilevel administra-
tion. Discordance of functional terms of governments in the individual countries 
and lengths of programming periods are problematic here. after elections into the 
national institutions, there is an effort to accept decisions and change existing ar-
rangements; the opposite occurs before elections when governments accept bigger 
decisions only exceptionally.
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